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Abstract
In this paper, we consider to use the quantum stabilizer codes as secret sharing schemes
for classical secrets. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified and
forbidden sets in terms of quantum stabilizers. Then, we give a Gilbert–Varshamov-
type sufficient condition for existence of secret sharing schemeswith given parameters,
and by using that sufficient condition, we show that roughly 19% of participants can
be made forbidden independently of the size of classical secret, in particular when an
n-bit classical secret is shared among n participants having 1-qubit share each. We
also consider how much information is obtained by an intermediate set and express
that amount of information in terms of quantum stabilizers. All the results are stated
in terms of linear spaces over finite fields associated with the quantum stabilizers.
Keywords Secret sharing · Quantum error-correcting code · Gilbert–Varshamov
bound
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing is a scheme to share a secret among multiple participants so that only
qualified sets of participants can reconstruct the secret, while forbidden sets have no
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information about the secret [36]. A piece of information received by a participant is
called a share. A set of participants that is neither qualified nor forbidden is said to
be intermediate. Both secret and shares are traditionally classical information. There
exists a close connection between secret sharing and classical error-correcting codes
[3,7,10,11,19,23,31].
After the importance of quantum information became well-recognized, secret shar-
ing schemes with quantum shares were proposed [8,15–17,37]. A connection between
quantum secret sharing and quantum error-correcting codes has been well known for
many years [8,13,15,21,22,35,37], none of which has determined the access structure
of secret sharing schemes with classical secrets and quantum shares constructed from
quantum stabilizer codes. The well-known classes of quantum error-correcting codes
are the CSS codes [6,38], the stabilizer codes [4,5,14] that include the CSS codes as
a special case, and their non-binary generalizations [2,18,29].
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of qualified sets, that of
intermediate sets and that of forbidden sets. For practical use of secret sharing, one
needs sufficient (and desirably necessary) conditions on qualified sets and forbidden
sets. It is natural to investigate access structures of secret sharing schemes constructed
from quantum error-correcting codes. For secret sharing schemes with quantum secret
and quantum shares, necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified sets and forbid-
den sets were clarified for the CSS codes [26,37] and the stabilizer codes [13,25]. For
classical secret and quantum shares, the access structure was clarified in [26, Section
4.1] with [33, Theorem 1] for the CSS codes but has not been clarified for secret
sharing schemes based on quantum stabilizer codes, as far as this author knows.
Advantages of using quantum shares for sharing a classical secret are that we can
have smaller size of shares [15, Section 4] and that we can realize access structures that
cannot be realized by classical shares [24,27]. For example, it is well known that the
size of classical shares cannot be smaller than that of the classical secret in a perfect
secret sharing scheme, where perfect means that there is no intermediate set, while
ramp or non-perfect means that there exist intermediate sets [39]. On the other hand,
the superdense coding can be a secret sharing scheme sharing 2 bits by 2 qubits sent
to 2 participants [15, Section 4]. Any participant has no information about the secret,
while the 2 participants can reconstruct the secret. We see a perfect threshold scheme
sharing 2-bit classical secret by 1-qubit shares. This paper will generalize Gottesman’s
secret sharing [15, Section 4] to the arbitrary number of participants and the arbitrary
size of classical secrets.
In this paper, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden
sets in terms of the underlying linear spaces over finite fields of quantum stabilizers
in Sect. 3, after introducing necessary notations in Sect. 2. Section 3 also includes
sufficient conditions in terms of a quantity similar to relative generalized Hamming
weight [20] of classical linear codes related to the quantumstabilizers.Wealso consider
how much information is obtained by an intermediate set and express that amount of
information in terms of the underlying linear spaces of quantum stabilizers in Sect. 4.
Then,we translate our theorems over primefinite fields by the symplectic inner product
into arbitrary finite fields, the Euclidean, and the hermitian inner products in Sect. 5.
Section 5 also includes an elementary construction by the Reed–Solomon codes as an
example of Sect. 5.3. Finally, we give a Gilbert–Varshamov-type sufficient condition
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for existence of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and by using that
sufficient condition, we show that roughly 19% of participants can be made forbidden
independently of the size of classical secret, which cannot be realized by classical
shares, in Sect. 6. Concluding remarks are given in Sect. 7. The extended abstract
[28] in the workshop had no mathematical proofs and only few examples due to space
limitation, and there were confusing typographical errors in the main theorems [28,
Theorems 18 and 19].
2 Notations
Let p be a prime number,Fp the finite fieldwith p elements, andCp the p-dimensional
complex linear space. The quantum state space of n qudits is denoted by C⊗np with its
orthonormal basis {|v〉 : v ∈ Fnp}.
For two vectors a, b ∈ Fnp, denote by 〈a, b〉E the standard Euclidean inner product.
For two vectors (a|b) and (a′|b′) ∈ F2np , we define the standard symplectic inner
product
〈(a|b), (a′|b′)〉s = 〈a,b′〉E − 〈a′,b〉E .
For an Fp-linear space C ⊂ F2np , C⊥s denotes its orthogonal space in F2np with
respect to 〈·, ·〉s . Throughout this paper, we always assume dimC = n − k and
C ⊆ C⊥s .
For (a|b) ∈ F2np , define the pn × pn complex unitary matrix X(a)Z(b) as defined
in [18]. An [[n, k]]p quantum stabilizer codes Q encoding k qudits into n qudits can
be defined as a simultaneous eigenspace of all X(a)Z(b) ((a|b) ∈ C). Unlike [18],
we do not require the eigenvalue of Q to be one.
It is well known inmathematics [1, Chapter 7] that there always existsC ⊆ Cmax ⊆
C⊥s such that Cmax = C⊥smax. Note that Cmax is not unique and usually there are
many possible choices of Cmax. We have dimCmax = n and have an isomorphism
f : Fkp → C⊥s/Cmax as linear spaces without inner products. Since Cmax = C⊥smax,
Cmax defines an [[n, 0]]p quantum stabilizer code Q0. Without loss of generality, we
may assume Q0 ⊂ Q. Let |ϕ〉 ∈ Q0 be a quantum state vector. Since Cmax = C⊥smax,
for a coset V ∈ C⊥s/Cmax and (a|b), (a′|b′) ∈ V , X(a)Z(b)|ϕ〉 and X(a′)Z(b′)|ϕ〉
differ by a constant multiple in C and physically express the same quantum state in
Q. By an abuse of notation, for a coset V ∈ C⊥s/Cmax we will write |Vϕ〉 to mean
X(a)Z(b)|ϕ〉 ((a|b) ∈ V ).
For a given classical secret m ∈ Fkp, we consider the following secret sharing
scheme with n participants:
1. f (m) is a coset of C⊥s/Cmax. Prepare the quantum codeword | f (m)ϕ〉 ∈ Q that
corresponds to the classical secret m.
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword | f (m)ϕ〉 to a participant.
We can also consider a secret sharing scheme for a k-qudit secret |m〉 with n par-
ticipants as follows. The reason why we also consider secret sharing schemes with
quantum secrets is to contrast the difference between the classical and the quantum
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access structures of a secret sharing scheme constructed from the same quantum sta-
bilizer in Remarks 7 and 10, while the main focus of the present paper is to share
classical secrets.
1. Encode a given quantum secret
∑
m∈Fkp α(m)|m〉 into the quantum codeword∑
m∈Fkp α(m)| f (m)ϕ〉 ∈ Q, where α(m) ∈ C are complex coefficients with∑
m∈Fkp |α(m)|2 = 1.
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword
∑
m∈Fkp α(m)| f (m)ϕ〉 to a partic-
ipant.
Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be a set of shares (or equivalently participants), A =
{1, . . . , n}\A, and TrA the partial trace over A. For a density matrix ρ, col(ρ) denotes
its column space. When col(ρ1), . . . , col(ρn) are orthogonal to each other, that is,
ρiρ j = 0 for i = j , we can distinguish ρ1, . . . , ρn by a suitable projective measure-
ment with probability 1.
Definition 1 We say A to be c-qualified (classically qualified) if col(TrA(| f (m)ϕ〉〈 f (m)ϕ|)) and col(TrA(| f (m′)ϕ〉〈 f (m′)ϕ|)) are orthogonal to each other for dif-
ferent m, m′ ∈ Fkp. We say A to be c-forbidden (classically forbidden) if
TrA(| f (m)ϕ〉〈 f (m)ϕ|) is the same density matrix regardless of classical secret m.
By a classical access structure, we mean the set of c-qualified sets and the set of
c-forbidden sets.
For a quantum secret, the quantum qualified (q-qualified) sets and the quantum
forbidden (q-forbidden) sets are mathematically defined in [33]. By a quantum access
structure, we mean the set of q-qualified sets and the set of q-forbidden sets.
Remark 2 When classical shares on A are denoted by SA, the conventional definition
of qualifiedness is I (m; SA) = H(m) and that of forbiddenness is I (m; SA) = 0
[39], where H(·) denotes the entropy and I (·; ·) denotes the mutual information [9].
Let ρA = ∑m∈Fkp p(m)TrA(| f (m)ϕ〉〈 f (m)ϕ|), where p(m) is the probability dis-
tribution of classical secrets m. The quantum counterpart of mutual information for
classical random variables is the Holevo information I (m; ρA) [32, Section 12.1.1].
A is c-qualified if and only if I (m; ρA) = H(m), and is c-forbidden if and only if
I (m; ρA) = 0. Therefore, Definition 1 is a natural generalization of the conventional
definition in [39].
Example 3 Wewill see how one can express the secret sharing scheme based on super-
dense coding [15, Section 4] by a quantum stabilizer. Let p = 2, n = 2 and C be the
zero-dimensional linear space consisting of only the zero vector. Then,C⊥s = F42. We
choose Cmax as the space spanned by (1, 1|0, 0) and (0, 0|1, 1). For a classical secret
(m1,m2) ∈ F22, define themap f as f (m1,m2) = (m1, 0|m2, 0)+Cmax ∈ C⊥s/Cmax.
We can choose [[2, 0]]2 quantumcode Q0 as the one-dimensional complex linear space
spanned by the Bell state
|ϕ〉 = |00〉 + |11〉√
2
,
123
Classical access structures of ramp secret sharing based… Page 5 of 16 9
which corresponds to the two-bit secret (0, 0). The secret (m1,m2) is encoded to
X(m1, 0)Z(m2, 0)|ϕ〉 = |m10〉 + (−1)
m2 |(1 − m1)1〉√
2
.
It is clear that the share set {1, 2} is c-qualified. When A = {1} or A = {2}, we have
TrA(| f (m)ϕ〉〈 f (m)ϕ|) =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
which means {1}, {2} and ∅ are c-forbidden. We have determined the classical access
structure completely, and we see that this scheme is perfect [39] in the sense that there
is no intermediate set.
For completeness, we also note its quantum access structure. The set {1, 2} is q-
qualified and ∅ is q-forbidden, of course. By [25, Eq. (3)], we see that {1} and {2} are
intermediate, that is, neither qualified nor forbidden. This quantum access structure
exemplifies the fact that q-qualifiedness implies c-qualifiedness, that q-forbiddenness
implies c-forbiddenness and that their converses are generally false [33, Theorems 1
and 2]. It also exemplifies the fact that if quantum secret is larger than quantum shares,
then the scheme cannot be perfect [8,15].
3 Necessary and sufficient conditions on classically qualified and
classically forbidden sets
Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Define FAp = {(a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) ∈ F2np : (ai , bi ) = 0 for
i /∈ A}. Let PA be the projection map onto A, that is, PA(a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) =
(ai |bi )i∈A.
Theorem 4 For the secret sharing scheme described in Sect. 2, A is c-qualified if and
only if
dimCmax/C = dimCmax ∩ FAp/C ∩ FAp . (1)
A is c-forbidden if and only if
0 = dimCmax ∩ FAp/C ∩ FAp . (2)
The proof is given after showing two examples below.
Example 5 Consider the situation in Example 3. For A = {1} or A = {2}, we see that
Cmax ∩FA2 and C ∩FA2 are the zero linear space and that Eq. (2) holds. For A = {1, 2},
Eq. (1) is clearly true.
Example 6 In this example, we show that a different choice of Cmax gives a different
access structure. Let C be as Example 5 and Cmax be the linear space generated by
(0, 0|1, 0) and (0, 0|0, 1). A classical secret (m1,m2) is now encoded to |m1m2〉. For
A = {1} or A = {2}, both (1) and (2) are false and both A = {1} and A = {2} are
intermediate sets. This example shows that the choice of Cmax is important.
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Proof (Theorem4)AssumeEq. (1). Then, there exists a basis {(a1|b1)+C, . . . , (ak |bk)
+ C} of Cmax/C such that (ai |bi ) ∈ FAp . Since C⊥smax = Cmax, any two vectors in a
coset V ∈ C⊥/Cmax have the same value of the symplectic inner product against a
fixed (ai |bi ), which will be denoted by 〈(ai |bi ), V 〉s . Suppose that we have two differ-
ent cosets V1, V2 ∈ C⊥/Cmax, and that 〈(ai |bi ), V1〉s = 〈(ai |bi ), V2〉s for all i . Since
C⊥smax = Cmax, it means that V1 − V2 = Cmax is zero in C⊥/Cmax, a contradiction.
We have seen that any two different cosets have different symplectic inner product
values against some (ai |bi ). For each i , the n participants can collectively perform
quantum projectivemeasurement corresponding to the eigenspaces of X(ai )Z(bi ) and
can determine the symplectic inner product1 〈(ai |bi ), f (m)〉s as [18, Lemma 5] when
the classical secret is m. Since (ai |bi ) has nonzero components only at A, the above
measurement can be done only by A, which means A can reconstruct m.
Assume that Eq. (1) is false. Since the orthogonal space of C in FAp is iso-
morphic to PA(C⊥s), which can be seen as the almost same argument as the
duality between shortened linear codes and punctured linear codes [34], we see that
dim PA(C⊥s)/PA(Cmax) < dimC⊥s/Cmax. This means that there exists two differ-
ent classical secretsm1 andm2 such that PA( f (m1)) = PA( f (m2)). This means that
the encoding procedures of m1 and m2 are exactly same on A and produce the same
density matrix on A, which shows that A is not c-qualified.
Assume Eq. (2). Then, we have dim PA(C⊥s)/PA(Cmax) = 0. This means that
for all classical secrets m, PA( f (m)) and their encoding procedures on A are same,
which produces the same density matrix on A regardless of m. This shows that A is
c-forbidden.
Assume that Eq. (2) is false. Then, there exist two different classical secrets m1,
m2, and (a|b) ∈ Cmax ∩ FAp\C ∩ FAp such that
〈(a|b), f (m1)〉s = 〈(a|b), f (m2)〉s .
By [18, Lemma 5], this means that the quantum measurement corresponding
to X(a)Z(b) gives different outcomes with TrA(| f (m1)ϕ〉〈 f (m1)ϕ|) and TrA
(| f (m2)ϕ〉〈 f (m2)ϕ|). Since (a|b) ∈ FAp , measurement of X(a)Z(b) can be per-
formed only by participants in A. These observations show that A is not c-forbidden.

Remark 7 A necessary and sufficient condition for A being q-qualified is [25, Eq. (3)]
C⊥s ∩ FAp = Cmax ∩ FAp = C ∩ FAp . (3)
Since ker(PA) = FAp , we have dim PA(C⊥s)/PA(Cmax) = k. The relation between
duals of punctured codes and shortened codes [34] implies dimCmax∩FAp/C∩FAp = k.
Therefore, Eq. (3) implies Eq. (1).
1 If we assume a non-prime finite field Fq as our base field, then the quantum measurement outcome just
determines [18, Lemma 5] Trq/p(〈(ai |bi ), f (m)〉s ) in place of 〈(ai |bi ), f (m)〉s , where Trq/p is the trace
map from Fq to its prime subfield Fp . Assuming a non-prime field Fq significantly complicates the proofs
of Theorem 4 and Lemma 11. So we assume a prime finite field until Sect. 5.
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Similarly, by [15, Corollary 2], necessary and sufficient condition for A being q-
forbidden is
C⊥s ∩ FAp = Cmax ∩ FAp = C ∩ FAp . (4)
By a similar argument, we see that Eq. (4) implies Eq. (2).
Next, we give sufficient conditions in terms of the coset distance [11] or the first
relative generalized Hamming weight [20]. To do so, we have to slightly modify them.
For (a|b) = (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Fnp, define its symplectic weight swt(a|b) =
|{i : (ai , bi ) = (0, 0)}|. For V2 ⊂ V1 ⊂ F2np , we define their coset distance as
ds(V1, V2) = min{swt(a|b) : (a|b) ∈ V1\V2}.
Theorem 8 If |A| ≤ ds(Cmax,C) − 1, then A is c-forbidden. If |A| ≥ n −
ds(C⊥s,Cmax) + 1, then A is c-qualified.
Example 9 Consider the situation in Example 5. We have ds(C⊥,Cmax) = 1, which
implies that 2 shares form a c-qualified set. We also have ds(Cmax,C) = 2, which
implies that 1 share forms a c-forbidden set.
Proof (Theorem 8) If |A| ≤ ds(Cmax,C)−1, then there is no (a|b) ∈ Cmax∩FAp\C ∩
FAp and Eq. (2) holds.
Assume that |A| ≥ n−ds(C⊥s,Cmax)+1, or equivalently, |A| ≤ ds(C⊥s,Cmax)−
1. We have C⊥s ∩ FAp = Cmax ∩ FAp . We also have FAp = ker(PA), which means
dim PA(C⊥s) − dim PA(Cmax) = dimC⊥s − dimCmax = k. Since dimCmax ∩FAp −
dimC ∩ FAp = dim PA(C⊥s) − dim PA(Cmax) = k, we see that Eq. (1) holds with A.

Remark 10 By Remark 7 and a similar argument to the last proof, we see that if
|A| ≤ ds(C⊥s,C) − 1, then A is q-forbidden and that if |A| ≥ n − ds(C⊥s,C) + 1,
then A is q-qualified. Note that these observations can also be deduced from quantum
erasure decoding and [15, Corollary 2] and are not novel.
4 Amount of information possessed by an intermediate set
Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with A = ∅ and A = {1, . . . , n}. In this section, we study the
amount of information possessed by A.
Lemma 11 For two classical secrets m1 and m2, we have
– TrA(| f (m1)ϕ〉〈 f (m1)ϕ|) = TrA(| f (m2)ϕ〉〈 f (m2)ϕ|) if and only if f (m1) and
f (m2) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors in Cmax ∩ FAp , and
– col(TrA(| f (m1)ϕ〉〈 f (m1)ϕ|)) and col(TrA(| f (m2)ϕ〉〈 f (m2)ϕ|)) are orthogonal
to each other if and only if f (m1) and f (m2) give different symplectic inner
products for some vector (a|b) in Cmax ∩ FAp .
Proof Assume that f (m1) and f (m2) give the same symplectic inner product for all
vectors in Cmax ∩ FAp . Then, we have {PA(a|b) : (a|b) ∈ f (m1)} = {PA(a|b) :
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(a|b) ∈ f (m2)}, and the encoding procedure on A is the same form1 andm2, which
shows TrA(| f (m1)ϕ〉〈 f (m1)ϕ|) = TrA(| f (m2)ϕ〉〈 f (m2)ϕ|).
Assume that f (m1) and f (m2) give different symplectic inner products for
some vector (a|b) in Cmax ∩ FAp . Then, the quantum measurement corresponding
to X(a)Z(b) can be performed only by the participants in A and by [18, Lemma 5]
the outcomes for | f (m1)ϕ〉 and | f (m2)ϕ〉 are different with probability 1. This means
that col(TrA(| f (m1)ϕ〉〈 f (m1)ϕ|)) and col(TrA(| f (m2)ϕ〉〈 f (m2)ϕ|)) are orthogonal
to each other. 
Proposition 12 If dimCmax ∩ FAp/C ∩ FAp = , then the number of density matrices
in Λ = {TrA(| f (m)ϕ〉〈 f (m)ϕ|) : m ∈ Fkp} is p.
For a fixed density matrix ρ ∈ Λ, the number of classical secrets m such that
ρ = TrA(| f (m)ϕ〉〈 f (m)ϕ|) is exactly pk−.
Proof If PA(u1|v1) + PA(Cmax) = PA(u2|v2) + PA(Cmax) for (ui |vi ) ∈ f (mi ) with
classical secrets mi (i = 1, 2), then by Lemma 11 col(TrA(| f (m1)ϕ〉〈 f (m1)ϕ|))
and col(TrA(| f (m2)ϕ〉〈 f (m2)ϕ|)) are orthogonal. By the assumption, we have
dimCmax ∩ FAp/C ∩ FAp = dim PA(C⊥s)/PA(Cmax) = . There are p elements
in PA(C⊥s)/PA(Cmax), which shows the first claim.
The composite Fp-linear map “mod PA(Cmax)” ◦PA ◦ f from Fkp to PA(C⊥s)/
PA(Cmax) is surjective. Thus, the dimension of its kernel is k − , which shows the
second claim. 
Definition 13 In light of Proposition 12, the amount of information possessed by a set
A of participants is defined as
(log2 p) × dimCmax ∩ FAp/C ∩ FAp . (5)
Remark 14 When the probability distribution of classical secrets m is uniform, the
quantity in Definition 13 is equal to the Holevo information [32, Section 12.1.1]
counted in log2. To see this, firstly, the set Λ in Proposition 12 consists of non-
overlapping projection matrices and each matrix commutes with every other matrices
in Λ. So the Holevo information is just equal to the classical mutual information
[9] between random variable X , corresponding to classical secrets in Fkp, and random
variable Y , corresponding tomatrices inΛ, where Y is given as a surjective function of
X . ByProposition12,Y has theuniformprobability distribution.Therefore, I (X; Y ) =
H(Y ) = log2 |Λ| = Eq. (5).
We say that a secret sharing scheme is ri -reconstructible if |A| ≥ ri implies A
has i log2 p or more bits of information [12]. We say that a secret sharing scheme is
ti -private if |A| ≤ ti implies A has less than i log2 p bits of information [12]. In order
to express ri and ti in terms of combinatorial properties of C , we introduce a slightly
modified version of the relative generalized Hamming weight [20].
Definition 15 For two linear spaces V2 ⊂ V1 ⊂ F2np and i = 1, . . . , k, define the i th
relative generalized symplectic weight
dis(V1, V2) = min{|A| : dim FAp ∩ V1 − dim FAp ∩ V2 ≥ i}. (6)
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Note that d1s = ds . The following theorem generalizes Theorem 8.
Theorem 16
ti ≥ dis(Cmax,C) − 1,
rk+1−i ≤ n − dis(C⊥s,Cmax) + 1.
Example 17 Consider the situationofExample 9.Wehaved1s (Cmax,C) = d2s (Cmax,C)
= 2, and d1s (C⊥s,Cmax) = d2s (C⊥s,Cmax) = 1. Unlike the relative generalized Ham-
ming weight, we do not have the strict monotonicity in i of dis .
Proof (Theorem 16) Assume that |A| ≤ ti . By definition of dis , dimCmax ∩ FAp/C ∩
FAp ≤ i − 1, which shows the first claim.
Assume that |A| ≥ ri . Then, |A| ≤ dis(C⊥s,Cmax) − 1, which implies dimC⊥s ∩
FAp/Cmax∩FAp ≤ i−1. The last inequality implies dimCmax∩FAp/C∩FAp ≥ k−i+1.
which shows the second claim. 
5 Translations to arbitrary finite fields and to the ordinary Hamming
weight
5.1 Translation to arbitrary finite fields
Let q = pμ with μ ≥ 1, and {γ1, . . . , γμ} be a fixed Fp-basis of Fq . Ashikhmin
and Knill [2] proposed the following translation from Fq to Fp for quantum stabilizer
codes. LetM be aμ×μ invertiblematrix overFp whose (i, j) element is Trq/p(γiγ j ),
whereTrq/p is the tracemap fromFq toFp. Letφ be anFp-linear isomorphism sending
(a1,1, . . . , a1,μ, a2,1, . . . , an,μ|b1,1, . . . , b1,μ, b2,1, . . . , bn,μ) ∈ F2μnp to
⎛
⎝
μ∑
j=1
a1, jγ j , . . . ,
μ∑
j=1
an, jγ j
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
μ∑
j=1
b′1, jγ j , . . . ,
μ∑
j=1
b′n, jγ j
⎞
⎠ ∈ F2nq ,
where (b′i,1, . . . , b′i,μ) = (bi,1, . . . , bi,μ)M−1 for i = 1, . . . , n.
Ashikhmin and Knill proved the following.
Proposition 18 [2] Let C ⊂ F2nq . Then, dimFp φ−1(C) = μ dimFq C, and
φ−1(C)⊥s = φ−1(C⊥s), where dimFq is the dimension of a linear space considered
over Fq .
Let C ⊂ Cmax = C⊥smax ⊂ C⊥s ⊂ F2nq with dimFq C = n − k. Then, we have
φ−1(C) ⊂ φ−1(Cmax) = φ−1(Cmax)⊥s ⊂ φ−1(C)⊥s ⊂ F2μnp and we can construct a
secret sharing scheme by φ−1(C) ⊂ φ−1(Cmax). It encodes kμ log2 p = k log2 q bits
of classical secrets m ∈ Fkq into μn qudits in Cp, which can also be seen as n qudits
in Cq , where Cq is the q-dimensional complex linear space. Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}.
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By abuse of notation, by FAp we mean {(a1,1, . . . , a1,μ, a2,1, . . . , an,μ|b1,1, . . . , b1,μ,
b2,1, . . . , bn,μ) ∈ F2μnp : ai, j = bi, j = 0 for i /∈ A and j = 1, . . . , μ}.
We consider each qudit in Cq of the quantum codeword as a share and examine the
property of a share set A. We have
dimFq Cmax ∩ FAq /C ∩ FAq = μ dimFp φ−1(Cmax) ∩ FAp/φ−1(C) ∩ FAp . (7)
Equation (7) together with Theorem 4 implies
– A is qualified if and only if dimFq Cmax ∩ FAq /C ∩ FAq = dimFq Cmax/C , and
– A is forbidden if and only if dimFq Cmax ∩ FAq /C ∩ FAq = 0.
The above observation shows that Theorems 4 and 8 also hold for Fq . In addition,
Eq. (7) means that a share set A has (log2 q × dimFq Cmax ∩ FAq /C ∩ FAq )-bits of
information about the secretm ∈ Fkq , also generalizes the proof argument of Theorem
16, and implies that Theorem 16 also holds for Fq . In the sequel, we consider a qudit
in Cq as each share and dim means the dimension over Fq .
5.2 Translation to the Hamming distance and the hermitian inner product
Many of results in the symplectic construction of quantum error-correcting codes over
Fq are translated to Fq2 -linear codes with the hermitian inner product [2,18,29]. For
x ∈ Fn
q2
define xq as the component-wise qth power of x. For two vectors x, y ∈ Fq2 ,
define the hermitian inner product as 〈x, y〉h = 〈xq , y〉E . For D ⊂ Fnq2 , D⊥h denotes
the orthogonal space of D with respect to the hermitian inner product.
Only in Sects. 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, for A ⊂ {1,…, n}, define FAq = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈
Fnq : ai = 0 for i /∈ A}, and define PA to be the projection map onto A, that is,
PA(a1, . . . , an) = (ai )i∈A.
Theorem 19 Let D ⊂ Fn
q2
be an Fq2 -linear space. We assume dim D = k′ and
there exists Dmax such that D ⊂ Dmax ⊂ D⊥h and Dmax = D⊥hmax, which implies
dim Dmax = n/2. Then, D defines a secret sharing scheme based on the quantum
stabilizer defined by D encoding n − 2k′ symbols in Fq . A set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is
c-qualified if and only if dim Dmax/D = dim Dmax ∩ FAq2/D ∩ FAq2 . A set A ⊂
{1, . . . , n} is c-forbidden if and only if 0 = dim Dmax ∩ FAq2/D ∩ FAq2 . If |A| ≥
n − dH (D⊥h, Dmax) + 1, then A is c-qualified, and if |A| ≤ dH (Dmax, D) − 1, then
A is c-forbidden, where dH is the coset distance [11], or equivalently, the first relative
generalized Hamming weight [20].
Proof The proof is almost same as [18]. 
Example 20 Consider the situation in Example 9. Then, D = {0} and Dmax is the
one-dimensional F4-linear space spanned by (1, 1).
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5.3 Translation to the Hamming distance and the Euclidean inner product
Let C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq . A method to construct symplectic-self-orthogonal C ⊂ F2nq is to
use {(a|b) : a ∈ C2, b ∈ C⊥E1 } as C [5,18], where “⊥ E” denotes the Euclidean dual.
We have C⊥s = {(a|b) : a ∈ C1, b ∈ C⊥E2 }.
Example 21 Example 6 can also be described by C2 = {0}, C1 = F22, and C ′max ={(a|b) : a ∈ C2, b ∈ C⊥E2 }.
Remark 22 A suitable choice of Cmax is unclear as of this writing. A valid choice is
C ′max = {(a|b) : a ∈ C2, b ∈ C⊥E2 }, which gives the standard encoding [6,38] of
the CSS codes. But this choice gives no advantage over the purely classical secret
sharing constructed from linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 [3,7,19,23]. Because the necessary
and sufficient condition for c-qualified A is dim PA(C1)/PA(C2) = dimC1/C2 and
the necessary and sufficient condition for c-forbidden A is dim PA(C1)/PA(C2) = 0
by combining [26, Section 4.1] and [33, Theorem 1], which are exactly same [12] as
those of the purely classical secret sharing constructed from C2 ⊂ C1.
Theorem 23 Let E ⊂ Fnq be the Fq-linear space. We assume dim E = k′, and
there exists Emax such that E ⊂ Emax ⊂ E⊥E and Emax = E⊥Emax, which implies
dim Emax = n/2. Then, E defines a secret sharing scheme based on the quantum
stabilizer defined by E encoding n − 2k′ symbols in Fq . A set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is c-
qualified if and only if dim Emax/E = dim Emax∩FAq /E∩FAq . A set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is
c-forbidden if and only if 0 = dim Emax∩FAq /E∩FAq . If |A| ≥ n−dH (E⊥E , Emax)+1,
then A is c-qualified, and if |A| ≤ dH (Emax, E) − 1, then A is c-forbidden.
Proof The proof is almost same as [18]. 
Example 24 Example 3 is restored by choosing E = {0}, E⊥E = F22, and Emax as the
F2-linear space spanned by (1, 1). Thus, we see that Theorem23, in contrast to Remark
22, can provide a secret sharing scheme with an advantage over purely classical secret
sharing.
5.4 Construction by the Reed–Solomon codes
Also as an example of Theorem 23, an elementary construction by the Reed–Solomon
(RS) codes will be shown below. In Sect. 5.4, assume that n = q and k are positive
even integers. Fix n distinct elements α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fq . Define
RS(n, k) = {(g(α1), . . . , g(αn)) : g(x) ∈ Fq [x], deg g(x) < k}.
Then, RS(n, k)⊥E = RS(n, n − k) as n = q.
For a linear space V ⊂ Fnq , its j th generalized Hamming weight d jH (V ) is defined
by [34]
d jH (V ) = min{|A| : dim FAq ∩ V ≥ j}.
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For RS codes, d jH (RS(n, k)) = n − k + j [34].
Define
C = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n − k)/2)} ⊂ F2nq ,
Cmax = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, n/2)} ⊂ F2nq ,
which correspond to E = RS(n, (n − k)/2) and Emax = RS(n, n/2) in Theorem 23.
Then, we have
Cmax = C⊥smax,
C⊥s = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n + k)/2)},
dimC = n − k,
d js (Cmax,C) ≥ d js (Cmax, {0}) ≥ d j/2H (RS(n, n/2)) =
⌈
n + j
2
⌉
, (8)
d js (C
⊥s,Cmax) ≥ d js (C⊥s, {0}) ≥ d j/2H (RS(n, (n + k)/2)) =
⌈
n − k + j
2
⌉
.(9)
In particular, we have ds(Cmax,C) ≥ n/2 + 1 and ds(C⊥s,Cmax) ≥ (n − k)/2 + 1.
For a set of participants A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, A is forbidden if |A| ≤ n/2 and A is qualified
if |A| ≥ (n + k)/2, by Theorem 8 or also by Theorem 23.
By Theorem 16, ti ≥ (n + i)/2 − 1 and ri ≤ (n + i)/2. In addition, by the
definitions of ri and ti , we have ri ≥ ti + 1. So we see that ti = (n + i)/2 − 1 and
ri = (n + i)/2, which also imply that inequalities (8) and (9) are in fact equalities
by Theorem 16. Let ρA be the density matrix of quantum shares in a share set A ⊆
{1, . . . , n}. Until the end of Sect. 5.4, assume that classical secrets m are uniformly
distributed. From Remark 14 and those exact values of ri and ti for i = 1, . . . , k,
we see that the Holevo information [32, Section 12.1.1] (quantum counterpart of the
mutual information [9]) between m and ρA is
I (m; ρA) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if 0 ≤ |A| ≤ n2 ,
2
(|A| − n2
)
log2 q if
n
2 ≤ |A| ≤ n+k2 ,
k log2 q if
n+k
2 ≤ |A| ≤ n.
Observe here that one increment of the share size increases the Holevo information
by two Fq symbols. This is in sharp contrast with the classical linear secret sharing [3,
7,19,23], because one increment of the share size can increase the mutual information
by at most one Fq symbol in classical linear secret sharing, when each share is one
Fq symbol. Observe also that we have completely determined the classical access
structure of this quantum secret sharing scheme.
6 Gilbert–Varshamov-type existential condition
In this section, we give a sufficient condition for existence of C ⊂ Cmax = C⊥smax ⊂
C⊥s ⊂ F2nq , with given parameters.
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Theorem 25 If positive integers n, k, δt , δr satisfy
qn+k − qn
q2n − 1
δr−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q2 − 1)i + q
n − qn−k
q2n − 1
δt−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q2 − 1)i < 1, (10)
then there exist C ⊂ Cmax = C⊥smax ⊂ C⊥s ⊂ F2nq such that dimC = n − k,
ds(C⊥s,Cmax) ≥ δr and ds(Cmax,C) ≥ δt .
Proof The following argument is similar to the proof of Gilbert–Varshamov bound
for stabilizer codes [4]. Let Sp(q, n) be the set of invertible matrices on F2nq that does
not change the values of the symplectic inner product. Let A(k) be the set of pairs of
linear spaces (V ,W ) such that dim V = n − k and V ⊂ W = W⊥s ⊂ V⊥s ⊂ F2nq .
For e ∈ F2nq , define BV (k, e) = {(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e ∈ V⊥s\W } and BW (k, e) =
{(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e ∈ W\V }. It is known in mathematics [1, Chapter 7]
– for nonzero e1, e2 ∈ F2nq , there exists M ∈ Sp(q, n) such that Me1 = e2, and
– for (V1,W1), (V2,W2) ∈ A(k), there exists M ∈ Sp(q, n) such that MV1 = V2
and MW1 = W2.
For nonzero e1 , e2 ∈ F2nq with M1e1 = e2 (M1 ∈ Sp(q, n)) and some fixed
(V1,W1) ∈ A(k), we have
|BW (k, e1)|
= |{(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e1 ∈ W\V }|
= |{(MV1, MW1) : e1 ∈ MW\MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(M−11 MV1, M−11 MW1) : e1 ∈ M−11 MW\M−11 MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(MV1, MW1) : M1e1 ∈ MW\MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(MV1, MW1) : e2 ∈ MW\MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e2 ∈ W\V }|
= |BW (k, e2)|.
By a similar argument, we also see |BV (k, e1)| = |BV (k, e2)|.
For each (V ,W ) ∈ A(k), the number of e such that e ∈ W\V is |W | − |V | =
qn − qn−k . The number of triples (e, V , W ) such that 0 = e ∈ W\V is
∑
0 =e∈F2nq
|BW (k, e)| = |A(k)| × (qn − qn−k),
which implies
|BW (k, e)|
|A(k)| =
qn − qn−k
q2n − 1 . (11)
Similarly, we have
|BV (k, e)|
|A(k)| =
qn+k − qn
q2n − 1 . (12)
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If there exists (V ,W ) ∈ A(k) such that (V ,W ) /∈ BV (k, e1) and (V ,W ) /∈ BV (k, e2)
for all 1 ≤ swt(e1) ≤ δr − 1 and 1 ≤ swt(e2) ≤ δt − 1, then there exists a pair of
(V ,W ) with the desired properties. The number of e such that 1 ≤ swt(e) ≤ δ − 1 is
given by
δ−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q2 − 1)i . (13)
By combining Eqs. (11), (12) and (13), we see that Eq. (10) is a sufficient condition
for ensuring the existence of (V ,W ) required in Theorem 25. 
We will derive an asymptotic form of Theorem 25.
Theorem 26 Let R, εt and εr be nonnegative real numbers ≤ 1. Define hq(x) =
−x logq x − (1 − x) logq(1 − x). For sufficiently large n, if
hq(εt ) + εt logq(q2 − 1) < 1 and
hq(εr ) + εr logq(q2 − 1) < 1 − R,
then there exist C ⊂ Cmax ⊂ C⊥s ⊂ F2nq such that dimC = n − nR,
ds(C⊥s,Cmax) ≥ nεr and ds(Cmax,C) ≥ nεt.
Proof Proof can be done by almost the same argument as [30, Section III.C]. 
Theorem 26 has a striking implication that we can construct a secret sharing scheme
with roughly 19% of participants being forbidden independently of the size (i.e., R in
Theorem 26) of classical secrets for q = 2 and large n, as h2(0.19)+0.19 log2 3  1.
Such properties cannot be realized by classical shares.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered construction of secret sharing schemes for classical secrets
by quantum stabilizer codes and clarified their access structures, that is, qualified and
forbidden sets, in terms of underlying quantum stabilizers. We expressed our findings
in terms of linear spaces over finite fields associated with the quantum stabilizers and
gave sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets in terms of combinatorial
parameters of the linear spaces over finite fields. It allowed us to use classical coding
theoretic techniques, such as the Gilbert–Varshamov-type argument, and we obtained
a sufficient condition for existence of a secret sharing scheme with given parameters.
By using that sufficient condition, we demonstrated that there exist infinitely many
quantum stabilizers with which associated access structures cannot be realized by
any purely classical information processing. We have not thoroughly considered code
construction, which is a future research agenda.
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